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Offshore Petroleum Board Issues
This article identifies and comments on some of the issues which may be of
interest respecting petroleum operations in the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia
offshore areas. An emphasis has been placed on identifying some of the issues
from an operational context and from a regulator's perspective, with some legal
analysis provided where appropriate.
Cet article propose quelques 616ments de r6flexion sur certaines questions
concemant les operations p6troli~res extrac~tieres en Nouvelle-Ecosse et &
Terre-Neuve. L'auteur s'int6resse en particulier aux aspects op6rationnels et
r#glementaires et se livre A une analyse juridique de certaines considdrations.
* Manager, Legal and Land, Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board.
** Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board. In writing Part
II (Board Issues), Sections 1 and 2 were contributed by Angus Taylor and Sections 3 and 4 were
contributed by Jim Dickey.
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I. Evolution of the Offshore Boards
1. Rights of the Coastal State
As a background focus to an overview of the administration of petroleum
resources within the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia offshore areas, it
would be appropriate to briefly mention two aspects of offshore jurisdic-
tion respecting a coastal state; namely, the concepts of the territorial sea
and the exclusive economic zone. As the distinction between the territo-
rial waters and high seas evolved, there arose two matters which needed
to be addressed; first, the nature of the coastal state's rights with respect
to its territorial waters, and second, the extent of these waters. The issue
of the nature of the coastal state's rights was considered by the English
Court for Crown Cases Reserved in R. v. Keyn. I The issue on the appeal
was whether the court (having convicted the accused of manslaughter)
had the jurisdiction to try him given that he was a foreigner, even though
he was, at the time of the event, within Britain's territorial seas. The
majority had decided that although Britain had claimed jurisdiction
1. (1876) 2 Ex. D. 63 [hereinafter Franconia].
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within the three-mile territorial sea, it had not expressly done so by statute
and for that reason could not extend its jurisdiction to foreigners and
foreign ships beyond its shores.
In the Franconia case Cockburn C.J. set out two requirements for
domestic law to be applicable in the territorial sea. First, there must be
a customary international law or a treaty permitting the practice, and
second, there must be an act of Parliament which confers domestic
jurisdiction. Cockburn C.J. states in his decision,
[t]he assent of nations is doubtless sufficient to give the power of
parliamentary legislation in a matter otherwise within the sphere of
international law; but it would be powerless to confer without such
legislation ajurisdiction beyond and unknown to the law, such as that now
insisted on, a jurisdiction over foreigners in foreign ships on a portion of
the high seas.2
Today the basic rule of public law governing the application of Canadian
law to the offshore is that no law, whether statute or common law, extends
beyond the low-water mark unless specifically extended by Parliament.
Insofar as the extent of the territorial sea is concerned, international
law has since recognized that a coastal state has the right to establish a
territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles from land. In Canada's case, the
struggles over territorial sovereignty and the application of laws within
this territorial sea have not occurred so much in the context of interna-
tional disputes, but instead have evolved through the context of domestic
disputes. More significantly, these disputes, particularly with regard to
seabed resources, have created more interest for those areas which extend
beyond the territorial sea into the internationally established contiguous
zone. (The most relevant Canadian cases include the B.C. Offshore
Reference,3 the Newfoundland Reference,4 the Georgia'Strait Refer-
ence5 and the Hibernia Reference.6 )
2. Ibid. at 203.
3. In the matter ofa reference by the governor general in council concerning the ownership
of the jurisdiction over offshore mineral rights as set out in order in council P.C. 1965-750
dated April 26, 1965, 19671 S.C.R. at 792 [hereinafter B. C. Offshore Referencel.
4. Reference Re: Mineral and other natural resources of the continental shelf appurtenant to
the province of Newfoundland, [1983] 145 D.L.R. (3d) 9 [hereinafter Newfoundland Refer-
ence].
5. Reference re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas, [1984] 1
S.C.R. 388 [hereinafter Georgia Strait Reference].
6. Reference Re the Seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf offshore Newfoundland,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 86 [hereinafter Hibernia Reference].
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The evolution of this contiguous zone has given rise to an apparently
acceptable concept of coastal state jurisdiction within an area referred to
as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The EEZ extends seaward from
the coastal state's baseline up to a distance of 200 nautical miles within
which certain rights such as the exploitation of natural resources may be
enjoyed by the coastal state and through and over which other states may
enjoy freedom of passage. Although its origins are not recent, the actual
concept of such a zone began in 1971 and reached fruition through the
third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.7 It is neither
territorial nor high seas but a separate area of sui generis character which
gives rise, inter alia, to rights and duties under the UNCLOS III to the
coastal state. It is in this context that the basis of some of the Canadian
legislation may be studied as it applies to the exploitation of petroleum
resources within its offshore areas.
2. The Creation of the Canada-Newfoundland/Nova Scotia Accords
and Accord Legislation
a. The Canada-Newfoundland Accord and Accord Legislation
Canada, like other coastal states, has been exercising its rights over the
continental shelf in the search for hydrocarbons, but, as previously
mentioned, not without domestic conflagration. Beginning with the
Newfoundland offshore area, political negotiations between Newfound-
land and Ottawa respecting offshore management in the Newfoundland
offshore area were not entirely accommodating. Consequently, both
parties resorted to the courts to determine jurisdictional issues relating to
the exploitation of hydrocarbons within the continental shelf. In the
Hibernia Reference,9 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that New-
foundland did not exercise jurisdiction within the continental shelf, the
result of which may have provided the impetus, together with a more
conciliatory approach by both governments, to resolve the issue through
agreement.
On 11 February 1985 the Prime Minister of Canada and the Premier of
Newfoundland (together with other signatories) signed the Atlantic
Accord 10 which brought about the basis upon which the legislative
framework could be built regarding petroleum operations within the
Newfoundland offshore area.
7. (New York: United Nations, 1983) [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
8. See A.R. Lucas & C.D. Hunt, Oil and Gas Law in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1990).
9. Supra note 6.
10. The Atlantic Accord; Memorandum Of Agreement Between The Government Of Canada
And The Government Of Newfoundland And Labrador On Offshore Oil And Gas Resource
Management And Revenue Sharing (11 February 1985) [hereinafter Atlantic Accord].
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The creation of the Atlantic Accord, which brought about the begin-
ning of a cooperative regime for offshore resource management, was
based upon objectives which may be summarized as follows: (1) provide
for a stable and permanent management regime for industry which
recognized the equality of both governments; (2) ensure that resource
development enhances social and economic benefits to Canada, particu-
larly to Newfoundland and Labrador; (3) allow Canadians, and particu-
larly residents of Newfoundland and Labrador, to compete on a fair and
competitive basis for jobs; (4) increase energy security and economic
prosperity; (5) provide for revenue sharing on the same basis as if these
resources were on land; (6) protect the environment and fishing industry;
and (7) improve the safety of offshore work.
It was not until 4 April 1987 that these objectives were legislatively
manifested by the coming into force of the Canada-Newfoundland
Atlantic Accord Implementation Act " and the Canada-Newfoundland
Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland Act. 2
b. The Canada-Nova Scotia Accord and Accord Legislation 13
In the case of the Nova Scotia offshore area, an agreement was reached
in 1982 between the governments of Canada and Nova Scotia which
provided for a "most favoured province" right in the event the Govern-
ment of Canada entered into a similar agreement with another coastal
province. As mentioned above, the Atlantic Accord was signed with
Newfoundland, and in exercising its rights respecting a "most favoured
province," a subsequent and revised Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore
Petroleum Resources Accord 4 was signed on 26 August 1986 between
the Prime Minister and the Premier of Nova Scotia. The Nova Scotia
Accord ultimately gave rise to the coming into force of the Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act 15 and
the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Imple-
mentation (Nova Scotia) Act. 16 The Nova Scotia Accord was established
using objectives similar to those of the Atlantic Accord, resulting in
11. S.C. 1987, c. 3 [hereinafter Newfoundland Accord Act].
12. R.S.N. 1990, c. C-2 [together with the NewfoundlandAccordAct, hereinafter Newfound-
land Accord Acts].
13. Supra note 8.
14. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord (26 August 1986) [herein-
after Nova Scotia Accord].
15. S.C. 1988, c. 28 [hereinafter Nova Scotia Accord Act].
16. S.N.S. 1987, c. 3 [together with the Nova Scotia Accord Act, hereinafter Nova Scotia
Accord Acts]. The Newfoundland Accord Acts and Nova Scotia Accord Acts are referred to
collectively as the Accord Acts.
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provisions for the Nova Scotia Accord Acts which are nearly identical to
those of the Newfoundland Accord Acts.
The provisions contained under the Newfoundland Accord Acts and
the Nova Scotia Accord Acts are partially the result of the evolution of
petroleum legislation dating back to the early 1960s. To assert a Canadian
presence, following initial discussions on the Law of the Sea, the federal
government promulgated the Canada Oil and Gas Lands Regulations 17
under the authority of the Public Lands Grants Act,I8 to provide for the
issuance and disposition of petroleum rights in the offshore areas.
Industry response was favourable, with large tracts of exploration rights
issued to various interest owners, a number of whom are still actively
involved in offshore exploitation. To meet the challenges associated with
petroleum exploitation, and to implement government policy, the above
legislation witnessed a number of amendments until replaced with the
Canada Oil and Gas Act, 19 which was eventually superseded by the
current federal statutes, namely the Canada Petroleum Resources Act 20
and the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act.2 1 It was from these latter
two federal statutes that similar provisions as contained under Part II
(Petroleum Resources) and Part III (Petroleum Operations) of theAccord
Acts evolved, thus creating a consistent management regime for petro-
leum activity in all frontier areas in Canada.
c. Creation of the Boards
In their creation, the Accord Acts established the Canada-Newfoundland
Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NOPB) and the Canada-Nova Scotia
Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NSOPB; and, with the C-NOPB, the
Boards). As a result, the Boards have been provided with the authority
and power to administer the management regime within their respective
offshore areas.
The Accord Acts, insofar as the management and administration of the
offshore regime is concerned, brought about two significant changes.
First, the decision-making process shifted from the bureaucracy of both
governments within each respective area, to an entity separate from
government. That is not to say that government's role was eliminated, as
will be pointed out below. The second change resulted in the lessening
of discretionary power by the administrator (previously the "Minister"
17. C.R.C. 1978, c. 1518.
18. R.S.C. 1985, c. P-30 (rep. by S.C. 1991, c. 50, s. 50).
19. R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-6 (rep. by the Canada Petroleum Resources Act, infra note 20, s. 130).
20. R.S.C. 1985, c. 36 (2nd Supp.).
21. R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-7.
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under the Canada Oil and Gas Act 22), and created instead more defined
criteria and processes whereby decisions may be made.
Under the Accord Acts, the Boards consist of members separately
appointed by each of the federal and the respective provincial govern-
ments for each area, with the Chairman appointed jointly by both
governments.
The C-NOPB is to consist of seven members, including the Chairman,
of which three are appointed by the federal government, and three by the
provincial government. One or two of these members may be designated
as vice-chairman who, together with the Chairman, work full-time as the
Executive Committee at the C-NOPB's office in St. John's, Newfound-
land. None of the C-NOPB' s members or employees may be employed
in the public service of Canada or Newfoundland during their tenure.
The C-NSOPB is to consist of five members, including the Chairman,
of which two are appointed by each respective government. Unlike the
C-NOPB, two members of the C-NSOPB may, during their tenure, be
employed in the public service of Canada or Nova Scotia, providing that
not more than one member be appointed by each government. The
Chairman, however, shall not be a member of the public service, nor shall
the staff be considered to be employed in the public service of Canada or
the province. The office of the C-NSOPB is located in Halifax. Board
members are appointed on a staggered term basis and may continue to
hold office during good behaviour. Employees of the Boards on the other
hand, are employed on the basis of merit pursuant to the administrative
powers vested to each respective Board.
3. Provincial/Federal Relationships over Offshore Resources
Even though Canadian constitutional law settled the question of owner-
ship over offshore resources in Canada's favour, the Atlantic and Nova
Scotia Accords themselves are significant because they set aside the
question of ownership and provide for Canada, Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia to manage those resources jointly within the respective areas. As
mentioned above, the Hibernia Reference23 settled the question of
ownership over offshore resources in Canada's favour, leading to the
successful negotiation of the Accords. The Accords, and the subsequent
22. Supra note 19.
23. Supra note 6.
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proclamation of the Accord Acts, solidify the agreement respecting
ownership of offshore resources by providing the following:
For greater certainty, the provisions of this Act shall not be interpreted as
providing a basis for any claim by or on behalf of any province in respect
of any interest in or legislative jurisdiction over any offshore area or any
living or non-living resources of any offshore area.24
With respect to the regulation-making power of governments, the Accord
Acts in dealing with all aspects of law-making, including resource
management and revenue sharing, ensure that neither government will
introduce amendments to the Accord Acts, or any regulation made
thereunder, without the consent of both governments. Furthermore, each
Board may only be dissolved by thejoint operation of an act of parliament
and an act of the legislature of the province.
4. The Boards' Areas of Jurisdiction
The area within the C-NOPB's administrativejurisdiction (offshore area)
consists of approximately 166 million hectares and is defined under s. 2
of the Newfoundland Accord Acts:
In this Act,
"offshore area" means those submarine areas lying seaward of the low
water mark of the Province and extending, at any location, as far as:
any prescribed line; or,
where no line is prescribed at that location, the outer edge of the continental
margin or a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of Canada is measured, whichever
is greater.
For rights management purposes, the offshore area has been divided by
the C-NOPB into two zones. Zone A comprises thirty full grids (some 1.1
million hectares) located in the northeast Grand Banks area, while Zone
B covers the remaining offshore area. The size of parcels to be nominated
and rentals applicable to exploration licences vary according to the zones.
The area within the C-NSOPB's administrative jurisdiction (offshore
area) is also defined under s. 2 of the Nova Scotia Accord Acts, and
consists of approximately 40 million hectares. This definition is, unlike
that of Newfoundland, more specifically defined as "the lands and
submarine areas within the limits described in Schedule I." Schedule I is
a detailed description which demarcates the offshore area through a series
of latitudinal/longitudinal coordinates with the other Atlantic provinces,
24. The Newfoundland Accord Acts, supra note 12 and the Nova Scotia Accord Acts, supra
note 16, s. 3.
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as well as, the Single Maritime Boundary between Canada and the United
States in the Georges Bank. The maritime boundary described under
Schedule I between Newfoundland and Nova Scotia is currently under
dispute pending resolution by governments.
Unlike the Newfoundland offshore area, the Nova Scotia offshore area
is not divided by the C-NSOPB into zones for rights administration
purposes. However, in the C-NSOPB Guidelines on the Issuance of
Exploration Licences, s. 12 indicates that a call for bids will ordinarily be
for parcels no larger than 200 sections in the area of significant discov-
eries around Sable Island, or 800 sections elsewhere. Nominated parcels
should therefore be sized accordingly.
The mandate of the Boards, as derived through the Accord Acts,
includes the issuance and administration of petroleum exploration and
development rights in the respective offshore area; the administration of
statutory requirements regulating offshore exploration, development and
production; and the approval of Canada-NewfoundlandlNova Scotia
benefits and development plans.
5. The Administrative and Decision-Making Powers of the Boards
The Boards have a duty to perform their duties and functions pursuant to
the Accords and the AccordActs. It should also be noted that even though
the Accord Acts arose by virtue of the Accords, they do not eliminate the
Accords themselves. From a legal point of view this may have some
significance, in that the Accords carry with them a covenant that neither
government will introduce amendments to the Accord Acts without the
other's consent. In addition, there are some Board duties and functions
under the Accords which are not explicitly dealt with under the Accord
Acts, namely the requirement to keep both governments informed of
Board decisions, and the reporting of significant events or information to
government.
Although the performance of the Boards' functions and duties is an
ongoing daily affair, Board members are required to meet once every
month under the Newfoundland Accord Acts and once every two months
under the Nova Scotia Accord Acts, unless by unanimous agreement the
members of the respective Board defer such a meeting. Meetings could
also occur through the medium of teleconference, That is not to say that
decisions can only be made on a monthly or bi-monthly basis. On the
contrary, through the establishment of Board bylaws and the delegation
of powers most decisions may be made by each Board through the
Chairman, the Chief Executive Officer, or the Executive Connittee.
Although the exercise of the decision-making power of the Boards is
intended to be final, many of the Boards' decisions are subject to other
considerations. For the purpose of distinguishing the Boards' roles as
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decision-makers, the matters and decisions dealt with throughout the
Accord Acts may be categorized as follows:
(1) fundamental decisions by the Boards;
(2) decisions by the Boards subject to joint ministerial direc-
tives;
(3) matters requiring interaction by the Boards with the federal
minister or provincial minister (other than fundamental
decisions);
(4) proposed decisions by the Boards which may be subject to
review by the Oil and Gas Committee;
(5) decisions by the Boards which are neither subject to other
considerations such as ministerial approvals, directives nor
otherwise fettered;
(6) decisions other than by the Boards or ministers; and,
(7) decisions with respect to which explicit provisions may
allow for a review or appeal by the courts.
Although the appropriate provisions relating to the above are con-
tained in the Accord Acts, a word of explanation should be given
regarding fundamental decisions, ministerial directives, and the Oil and
Gas Committee.
A "fundamental decision"25 is one which is subject to ss. 31 to 40 of
the NewfoundlandAccordActs and ss. 30 to 39 of the Nova ScotiaAccord
Acts, which effectively means that the respective Board's decision must
be approved by one or both of the ministers. These decisions, together
with those subject to ministerial directives or consultation, provide the
degree of scrutiny and control desired by government, without necessar-
ily putting government in the position of influence or management in the
first instance.
With respect to ministerial directives, the ministers may jointly issue
written directives to each Board in relation to (1) fundamental decisions,
(2) decisions prohibiting work or activity in circumstances where danger-
ous or extreme weather conditions affect the health or safety of people or
equipment, (3) public reviews, (4) benefits plans, and (5) certain studies
to be conducted by each Board.26 Each Board shall comply with a
directive jointly issued.
Under the Accord Acts, an Oil and Gas Committee (OGC) may be
appointed by a Board for the purposes of fulfilling certain functions.
With respect to certain matters which relate to land tenure, an affected
25. The Newfoundland Accord Acts and the Nova Scotia Accord Acts, ibid., s. 2.
26. The Newfoundland Accord Acts, s. 42; the Nova Scotia Accord Acts, ibid., s. 41.
27. Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 11, s. 141; supra note 15, s. 145.
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party may refer a proposed decision by the Board to the OGC for its
review and recommendations. Such land tenure matters would include
decisions proposed by the Board respecting the declaration, amendment
or revocation of a significant or commercial discovery, the issuance of a
drilling order or development order, or the cancellation of an interest or
share due to non-compliance. It is important to note that the role of the
OGC in such instances is advisory. Other powers are vested with the OGC
respecting production and operation matters (e.g. orders respecting
prevention of waste, pooling orders, unitization orders). However, in any
case, the Board may vary or rescind any such decision or order made by
the OGC.
II. Board Issues
1. Onshore to Offshore Drilling - Dual Jurisdiction
a. Background
Since 1995 four wells have been spudded for the purpose of exploring
prospects in the offshore area adjacent to the west coast of Newfound-
land. Three of these have been directionally drilled using a land drill rig
located onshore, adjacent to an offshore exploration licence extending
seaward from the low-water mark. The following is an analysis of some
of the issues arising with respect to onshore to offshore drilling using the
west coast of Newfoundland as the illustrative context. The analysis also
includes some references to other jurisdictions and how they approach
similar issues. Similar issues would no doubt prevail should onshore to
offshore drilling occur with respect to the Nova Scotia offshore area.
Not surprisingly, when the Newfoundland Accord Acts were drafted
and came into force their provisions did not contemplate a scenario of
onshore to offshore drilling. Consequently the administration of such
work or activity assumed a dual jurisdictional character. In order to
position and operate a drilling rig onshore and to drill through the
intermediate onshore formations into the offshore area, the provincial
Department of Mines and Energy must grant an authorization. In
granting such authorization, considerations must be given to safety, the
environment, and the financial responsibility of the operator. By the same
token, because such a well is intended to explore a prospect within an
offshore exploration licence, the C-NOPB is legally compelled to address
those same considerations under a similar authorization. Although the
province and the C-NOPB have cooperated administratively to allow the
issuance of work authorizations for such a purpose, the practice has
become problematic (e.g. the application of offshore certification re-
quirements for onshore drilling rigs) and has the potential for giving rise
to greater concerns should a discovery be made and production pursued.
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For example, if a commercial discovery was made, potentially there
could be a desire, for economic reasons, to establish production/process-
ing facilities onshore. In addition, the granting and administration of
discoveries which straddle onshore and offshore licences and the atten-
dant production/conservation issues, not to mention the royalty regime
for such straddling discoveries, are matters which will need to be resolved
before production occurs.
b. Relevant Legislation to the Newfoundland Offshore Area
In the context of dual jurisdictional issues between the Government of
Newfoundland and Labrador, and the offshore area as administered by
the C-NOPB, the following is an overview of the legislative provisions
which serve some relevancy. 28
Section 5 of the Newfoundland and Labrador Petroleum Regulations 29
appears to be the only provision in provincial petroleum legislation or
regulations which could enable an agreement between the Newfoundland
government and another government body:
Where an interest holder has made a discovery of petroleum that extends
beyond the area under the sole petroleum administration of the Province,
the Minister, after consulting with the interest holder, shall undertake all
reasonable efforts to conclude such agreements as are necessary to ensure
that such discovery is developed and produced with the administrative
cooperation of the Province.
The provision is worded in an interesting fashion in that it suggests, by use
of the word "shall," an obligation on the minister. However, the use of
the phrase "undertake all reasonable efforts to conclude those agreements
that are necessary" diminishes that obligation and results in the phrase
being susceptible to a number of different interpretations, depending on
the circumstances, the interpreter and a number of other factors.
In reviewing the Newfoundland Accord Acts, there are provisions
which, to a limited extent, are relevant to the administration of arrange-
ments between the C-NOPB and the Government of Newfoundland and
Labrador for the drilling, discovery and production of petroleum in the
offshore. The Newfoundland Accord Acts, by virtue of their raison
d'etre, evidence the feasibility of a bilateral agreement between the
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador and the Government of
Canada regarding petroleum resource management. While the legisla-
tion addresses offshore petroleum, it remains silent with respect to the
management of onshore to offshore directional drilling. In light of the
28. The authors wish to acknowledge and thank Kathleen O'Neill of Cox Hanson O'Reilly
Matheson for her research assistance in relation to this portion of the article.
29. Nfld. Reg. 1150/96 [hereinafter Petroleum Regulations].
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agreement between federal and provincial governments on resource
management, there are two possible approaches to this issue. First,
legislation separate and apart from the Newfoundland Accord Acts could
be enacted to address the matter in question. A second approach would
be to consider necessary amendments to the Newfoundland Accord Acts
and regulations addressing the issue of interjurisdictional directional
drilling. Any amendments would require extensive consultation between
the governments and would require approval by both governments.
More specifically, under the Newfoundland Accord Acts, s. 3 may be
a "for greater certainty" clause, aimed at ensuring that no provision of the
Newfoundland Accord Acts would, under any circumstance, be inter-
preted to provide the province with jurisdiction over the offshore or
offshore resources.3° This provision would not, however, prohibit the C-
NOPB from entering into and administering, together with the govern-
ments, a memorandum of understanding aimed at the effective manage-
ment of a situation of onshore to offshore directional drilling.31 However,
any such memorandum of understanding cannot create new law and must
be bounded by the jurisdiction and authority vested by the Newfoundland
Accord Acts. Such an arrangement would operate in contravention to s.
3 if it attempted to transfer jurisdiction over the offshore to the province,
or exceeded jurisdiction otherwise.
It is noteworthy that the administration of such an agreement would be
in accord with s. 5 of the provincial Petroleum Regulations. In particular,
it is noteworthy that s. 46(1)(f) of the Newfoundland Accord Acts allows
for the establishment of such arrangements in relation to matters other
than those listed. Arguably, there could be no more appropriate situation
than that of directional drilling from the onshore to the offshore.
The Newfoundland Accord Acts also allow for the delegation of
powers and duties:
51 The Board may designate any person to exercise the powers and
perform the duties and functions under this Part that are specific in the
designation and on such designation that person may exercise those
powers and shall perform those duties and functions subject to such terms
and conditions, if any, as are specified in the designation.
32
137.1 The Board may delegate any of the Board's powers under section
138, 138.2, 138.3, 139.1, 139.2 or 163 to any person, and the person shall
exercise those powers in accordance with the terms of the delegation."
30. Newfoundland Accord Acts, supra note 12, s. 3.
31. Ibid., s. 46.
32. Supra note 11, s. 51.
33. Ibid., s. 137.1.
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Depending on the nature of an arrangement between the province and the
C-NOPB, an arrangement under s. 46(1)(f) could include a delegation of
power. As noted, such a delegation under s. 51 is not permitted with
respect to all duties incumbent on the C-NOPB, but is limited to those
powers and duties provided for in Part 11 (Petroleum Resources) of the
NewfoundlandAccord Acts. Furthermore, any delegation of power under
s. 137.1 of Part III (Petroleum Operations) is limited to specific provi-
sions. Nonetheless, with respect to the above mentioned powers and
duties, s. 46(1)(f) could potentially facilitate the administration of an
arrangement aimed at the resolution of the complications related to
onshore to offshore drilling. However, to the extent issues of proprietary
rights and jurisdiction arise as between federal and provincial govern-
ments, statutory amendments would need to occur.
As a final comment and as alluded to above, the most appropriate
course of action may be to enact amendments to existing legislation
which would allow for cooperation between the governments on this
matter. Such amendments could be brought to the attention of both
governments involved pursuant to s. 17(2) of the Newfoundland Accord
Acts:
The Board may make recommendations to both governments with respect
to proposed amendments to this Act, the Provincial Act and any regula-
tions made under those Acts.
The C-NOPB, in addressing onshore drilling, is therefore in a position to
advise both the federal and provincial governments of possible amend-
ments to the Newfoundland Accord Acts and provincial legislation and
regulations thereunder, particularly where issues respecting production
ownership and the application of royalties on straddling discoveries
become relevant.
c. Other Jurisdictions
There are no agreements between British Columbia and any other
jurisdictions which pertain to drilling near or across the provincial
boundary, as no such pools have been successfully produced. There have
been instances where a pool extends over two jurisdictions (Ring Border
gas pool in British Columbia and Alberta and Beaver River gas pool
between British Columbia and the Northwest Territories). These pools
were developed within the regulatory framework of their respective
jurisdictions. Ifi the case of the Ring Border field, the pool was unitized
separately on each side of the border. The British Columbia legislation
does not preclude the formation of such an agreement. Moreover, there
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are provisions in the province which allow for the administration of
intergovernmental arrangements.34
Still with British Columbia, the Northern Development Act" allows
the Northern Development Commissioner to invite other governments or
any of the agencies of those governments to join in activities under the
Act.36 The commission is charged with, among other things, promoting
private sector investments in northern British Columbia.37 If an intergov-
ernmental arrangement rendered the administration and regulation over
an interjurisdictional pool less duplicative and more effective (or indeed
possible where it would have otherwise been impossible), perhaps it
could be argued that the creation of the arrangement promoted investment
in Northern British Columbia.
There are no instances of cross-border drilling respecting Saskatchewan,
although inquiries into its feasibility have been made with respect to the
Lloydminster (Alberta/Saskatchewan border) and Gainsborough
(SaskatchewanlManitoba border) areas. There are, of course, instances
where an operator drills into a pool held by someone else, however, these
have occurred within the province and are dealt with by production
sharing or other such agreements.
There are many pools which underlie the Alberta/British Columbia or
the Alberta/Saskatchewan borders, but there are no formal agreements
between the governments involved regarding jurisdiction over the pools.
However, the Alberta legislation has provided enabling legislation for
such an agreement. The Energy Resources Conservation Act 3 contains
the following provision:
23(2) Subject to the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, the
Board may enter into any agreements it considers desirable with the
Government of Canada or an agency of it with respect to a matter relating
to the purposes of this Act or with any government of ajurisdiction outside
Alberta or an agency of that government in respect of the effects of that
matter in that jurisdiction.
34. Oil and Gas Commission Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 39, s. 6(1)(a) defines the capacity of the
commission to include the ability to
negotiate and enter into agreements with the government, or with an official or agency
of it or with any person, including, subject to the prior approval of the Lieutenant
Governor in Council, with the government of Canada, the government of another
province, First Nations or local governments, or with an official or agency of any of
them.
35. S.B.C. 1998, c. 19.
36. Ibid., s. 10.
37. Ibid., s. 4.
38. R.S.A. 1980, c. E-11.
66 The Dalhousie Law Journal
With respect to the North Sea, the question of jurisdiction resulting from
onshore to offshore drilling does not arise in the context of jurisdiction
over oil and gas, as both the offshore and onshore lie solely with the
central government. However, there are situations of some producing
fields which straddle the maritime boundaries with either Norway or the
Netherlands, and these have given rise to similar jurisdictional questions.
As regards the exercise of jurisdiction, the general rule is that an
installation is governed by the laws of the state on whose territory or
continental shelf it "sits."
In the case of the Markham Field Reservoirs,39 which straddle the
United Kingdom and Netherlands sectors, installations lie on either side
of the maritime boundary and these installations are linked by intrafield
pipelines, cables etc. In practice (and notwithstanding the jurisdictional
position), the field operator will, in these circumstances, probably seek to
meet the most stringent of the two legislative requirements, thereby
automatically satisfying the lesser.
As yet, there is no example of an installation on the United Kingdom
continental shelf being used to exploit a resource wholly on a neighbouring
continental shelf, or vice versa.
2. Disclosure of Information
a. Introduction
The following overview relates to the treatment and disclosure of
information or documentation received or held by the Boards in the
course of conducting their business. The primary focus will deal with the
role of each Board in administering the Accord Acts or any regulation
made thereunder, and its status as a government institution under the
federal Access to Information Act 40 and Privacy Act.4
Unless otherwise stated, statutory references will be to the Newfound-
land Accord Act.42 Virtually identical provisions exist for the provincial
versions of the Newfoundland Accord Act and the Nova Scotia Accord
Act. For easy reference, the provisions of the Newfoundland Accord Act
referred to below have been attached in Schedule "A". Although the use
of the term "Board" in this discussion refers to the C-NOPB, the effect
would be the same for the C-NSOPB.
39. See "Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands" The Hague (26 May 1992).
40. R.S.C. 1985, c. A-I [hereinafter AIA].
41. R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 [hereinafter PA].
42. Supra note 11.
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b. Relevant Legislation
Before addressing the Board's practice or policy respecting the treatment
or disclosure of information, the following legislative provisions must be
reviewed:
(1) Section 18 of the Newfoundland Accord Act
Section 18(1) allows each minister access to any information or docu-
mentation relating to petroleum resource activities in the offshore area
which is provided for the purposes of the Acts or regulations, without
requiring the consent of the party who provided such information.
Note that this provision relates to information provided for the pur-
poses of any part of the Accord Acts, or their regulations (i.e. it is not
limited to Parts II (Petroleum Resources) or III (Petroleum Operations)
of the Accord Acts). The only restrictions are that the information must
relate to petroleum resource activities in the offshore area and it must
have been provided for the purposes of the Accord Acts or regulations.
Arguably, some information held by the Board may not relate to offshore
petroleum resource activities; nor would it necessarily be provided for the
purposes of the Accord Acts or regulations (for example, information
relating to personnel/personal matters, third party information given in
confidence but not for the purposes of the Accord Acts or regulations,
certain contracts entered into by the Board regarding office operations,
etc.). Whether or not information is "relating to" or provided "for the
purposes of' is in itself open to interpretation and should be dealt with on
a case-by-case basis where the matter becomes debatable. What may also
be considered as a restriction relates to the fact that disclosure of
information under s. 18(1) is limited to the respective energy ministers
(or, in the province's case, the minister so designated). Legally, other
ministers have no right of access.
Section 18(2) makes s. 119 applicable to any such disclosure or the
giving of evidence by the minister with respect to such information
provided by the Board. Therefore some confidentiality restrictions will
apply to ministers.
(2) Section 119(2) of the Newfoundland Accord Act
Subject to the exceptions given below, this provision classifies all
information or documentation which is providedfor the purposes of Part
H or III of the Acts or any regulation made under these Parts, as
privileged. Such information or documentation shall not knowingly be
disclosed without the consent of the person who provided it. Under this
provision exceptions would allow limited disclosure:
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(a) to the ministers pursuant to s. 18,
(b) for the purposes of the administration or enforcement of Part
II or Ill,
43
(c) for the purpose of legal proceedings relating to the adminis-
tration or enforcement of Part II or III,"
(d) with respect to certain documents registered under Division
VIII (s. 119(4)), or
(e) as permitted by the provisions of s. 119(5).
Note that s. 119(2) is restricted to information or documentation provided
for the purposes of Part H or III of the Acts or any regulation made under
these Parts. Therefore, it could be argued that under this provision,
information provided for purposes other than under Parts II or III or the
regulations made under either part (i.e. information provided under Parts
I, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII) may not be privileged. This raises the question of
whether or not some sensitive information is susceptible to release (e.g.
information provided in relation to benefits matters under Part I). As
mentioned above, the question of whether information was provided "for
the purposes of" may be open to debate and interpretation. It is also
important to emphasize that because of s. 119(2), any information or
documentation provided for the purpose of Parts II or III, or their
regulations, other than information falling within the ambit of the above-
mentioned exceptions, is privileged permanently, unless the person
providing such information consents to its disclosure.
(3) Section 119(5) of the Newfoundland Accord Act
This provides that the general rule respecting privileged information
established under s. 119(2) does not apply with respect to specific classes
of information or documentation obtained as a result of carrying on a
work or activity that is authorized under Part IlI. In many classes, the
privileged status is removed following the passage of a particular time
period (refer to s. 1 19(5)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (i)). In other classes,
information will not be considered privileged at all, irrespective of the
passage of time (refer to s. 1 19(5)(f), (g), (g.1) and (h)).
There are three points worth noting with respect to s. 119(5). First, the
fact that it renders s. 119(2) inapplicable to particular classes of informa-
tion raises the question of whether the information could nonetheless be
privileged by virtue of other law. Secondly, although s. 1 19(2) does not
apply to such classes of information, the argument arises that s. 119(5)
does not make it mandatory for the Board to release the information.
43. See Canadian Forest Oil Ltd. v. Chevron Canada Resources (16 June 2000), A-58-00
(F.C.A.).
44. Ibid.
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(These points are more particularly discussed in Item b.(4) and Subsec-
tion c. below.) Thirdly, the information intended to be captured under
s. 119(5) must arise as a result of carrying on an authorized work or
activity in the offshore area. For example, well data or geophysical work
authorized by or in another jurisdiction (unless it is deemed to have been
authorized by the Board pursuant to transitional provisions of the Accord
Acts), or provided to the Board without the need for an authorization,
would not be captured by s. 119(5) and, therefore, the general rule under
s. 119(2) would apply if the information was provided for the purposes
so stated thereunder.
(4) Other Federal and Provincial Legislation Respecting Treatment of
Information
Under the federal jurisdiction, theAIA and the PA came into force in 1982
and comprehensively deal with the treatment and disclosure of informa-
tion held by a "government institution." By virtue of these acts, the
Boards are each considered a "government institution" and therefore are
supposed to be governed by the provisions of the AIA and PA. In essence,
the AIA and PA provide access to records held by the Boards subject to
following a particular procedure. In certain cases however, depending
upon the nature of the information, the Board either is required or has the
option, to refuse disclosure of information. The circumstances relating
to such cases are varied.
In the case of the AA, it is important to note that the legislation is
complementary in nature:
The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws of Canada to provide
a right of access to information in records under the control of a govern-
ment institution in accordance with the principles that governmnent infor-
mation should be available to the public, that necessary exceptions to the
right of access should be limited and specific and that decisions on the
disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently
of government.
This Act is intended to complement and not replace existing procedures for
access to government information and is not intended to limit in any way
access to the type of government information that is normally available to
the general public.45
Thus, the purpose of the AIA is to expand the means by which a person
can gain access to information in the possession of the government and
not to provide additional means by which access can be declined.
45. Supra note 40, s. 2(1), (2).
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There are provisions under the AIA however, where disclosure is
prohibited. A particularly important provision under the AIA is s. 24(1):
The head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record
requested under this Act that contains information the disclosure of which
is restricted by or pursuant to any provision set out in Schedule 11.46
The Schedule 11 referred to in s. 24(1) includes reference to s. 119 of the
Newfoundland Accord Act. Consequently, this provision requires the
Board, as a "government institution," to refuse disclosure of information
if the disclosure of that particular information is restricted by s. 119 of the
Newfoundland Accord Act, notwithstanding that the information could
otherwise be disclosed under theAIA. Therefore, the application of s. 119
becomes important since in some cases it restricts the disclosure of certain
information (respecting Parts II and III and their regulations, s. 119(2);
and work authorizations, s. 119(5)). However, in the case of s. 119(5),
once the periods referred to thereunder have expired (or for some cases
where no such time period applies), no such restriction exists and
therefore the Board could no longer deny disclosure on the basis of s. 24
of the AIA. If the Board therefore chooses to deny the disclosure of such
information because it believes it has a duty as a government institution
under the AIA, it would need to be for other reasons pursuant to another
provision under the AlA, or in limited cases, under the PA.
Another important provision under the AIA, particularly with respect
to the technical information held by the Board, is the following:
Subject to this section, the head of a government institution shall refuse to
disclose any record requested under this Act that contains
(a) trade secrets of a third party;
(b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that is
confidential information supplied to a government institution by a
third party and is treated consistently in a confidential manner by the
third party;
(c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
result in material financial loss or gain to, or could reasonably be
expected to prejudice the competitive position of, a third party; or
(d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a third party. 47
As indicated by para. (c), despite the fact that certain information is no
longer considered privileged by virtue of the expiry of specified time
periods under s. 119(5), the argument may nonetheless be raised that its
disclosure could be inhibited by other law, namely s. 20(1) of the AIA.
46. Ibid., s. 24(1).
47. Ibid., s. 20(1)
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If it was the intent under the Accord Acts to allow the AIA to prevail,
s. 20(1) of the AIA arguably makes it mandatory for the Board not to
disclose a record which, for example, is confidential technical informa-
tion provided to the Board and treated as such by the provider. Conse-
quently, the argument which would need to prevail is that such technical
information, although no longer privileged under s. 119(5), may still be
captured under s. 20(1) (or some other provision of the AIA or PA for that
matter). This will depend largely on how we wish to interpret s. 119(5)
as discussed in para. 3 below.
c. Relationship Between the Accord Acts and Other Statutes
In dealing with the AIA first, there are two perspectives from which the
provisions of s. 119 of the Newfoundland Accord Acts may be viewed.
First, s. 119(5) states that "[s]ubsection (2) does not apply.. . ." What
does this really mean? One interpretation is that the classes of informa-
tion are not privileged and may therefore be disclosed without consent.
In other words, if the rule of non-disclosure "does not apply," the
inference may be that disclosure is intended to apply, notwithstanding
anything in the AlA to the contrary.
On the other hand, the interpretation could be that in the context and
for the purpose of s. 119(2) only (i.e. in dealing with the relationship
between s. 119 (2) and s. 119(5) only without regard to other law such as
the AIA) those classes of information are not privileged nor do they
require consent for disclosure. The argument would remain, therefore,
that this interpretation would preserve the requirement of the Board, as a
government institution, to apply the AIA (e.g. s. 20) and possibly prevent
disclosure.
What was Parliament's intention with respect to the application of s.
119 and the provisions of the AA? If indeed it was Parliament's intention
to restrict the disclosure of such information through the application of
the AIA, why would provisions such as s. 119 be included as part of the
Newfoundland Accord Act? Would it not have been more efficacious
simply to refer to the AIA without setting out specific provisions under s.
119 or to have made s. 119(5) subject to the AIA?
Allowing for the precedence of theAccordActs over theAIA in the case
of inconsistency or conflict between the two acts (s. 4 of the Newfound-
land Accord Act), the Board should be free to disclose without consent
once the privileged status under s. 119(5) no longer applies. To do this
we would have to accept the first interpretation referred to above and
resolve the conflict in favour of the Accord Acts. The conflict would be
that on the one hand s. 119(5) at least impliedly says you may release
without consent, while s. 20(1) of the AIA says you refuse disclosure if
certain criteria prevail.
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What about the applicability of equivalent provincial law respecting
access to information? Given that the C-NOPB assumes its legal entity
through the Newfoundland Accord Acts, as proclaimed through both the
Parliament of Canada and the Legislature of the Province of Newfound-
land and Labrador, it is interesting to note that the Board has not been
given similar status under the provincial Freedom of Information Act 48
as that accorded federally under the AIA. Although the provisions are not
identical between the AIA and FIA, the objectives are essentially the
same, including the listing within a schedule of the FIA any Board to
which the FIA will apply. Such a schedule under the FIA does not include
the C-NOPB, nor has such status been given to the C-NSOPB respecting
similar provincial legislation in Nova Scotia.
Furthermore, the conspicuous non-applicable status of the FIA as
compared with the status of the AIA also suggests an underlying potential
jurisdictional issue. Under the Newfoundland Accord Acts and the
Atlantic Accord itself, both governments have agreed not to introduce
amendments to the NewfoundlandAccord Acts or any regulation without
the consent of the other. If in drafting s. 119 of the NewfoundlandAccord
Act, it was the intention of governments to treat the type of information
referred to within those provisions in such a way that its release would be
otherwise unfettered (i.e. without being bound by the AIA (or FIA)),
would not the application of the AIA effectively amend the purpose and
intent of s. 119 on a unilateral basis by the action of Parliament? If, on
the other hand, the AIA was intended by both governments to apply with
respect to the treatment of the type of information referred to under s. 119,
should not the language in the NewfoundlandAccordActs have explicitly
stated so, thereby effectively rendering the consent of both governments?
d. Board Practice or Policy
Presumably a fundamental objective of any Board practice or policy
relating to information is to facilitate its correct treatment or disclosure
in accordance with the law, regardless of its purpose or source. This
would include determining in the first instance whether or not the
particular record being sought is clearly a public or non-confidential one,
or whether it has some possibility of being confidential or sensitive
through the application of other law.
More specifically, in applying a practice or policy, the Board must
address how to deal with information held by it which (1) is privilegedby
virtue of the application of s. 119(2) of the NewfoundlandAccordAct; (2)
may be exempt from disclosure by virtue of the AIA or any other act or
48. R.S.N. 1990, c. F-25 [hereinafter FIA].
Regulatory Regime: Canada-Newfoundland/Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum 73
Board Issues
regulation, having regard to the intent of Parliament and the issues
surrounding the application of theAIA and theAccordActs; or (3) is either
not privileged or subject to restricted disclosure under the Newfoundland
AccordAct because it falls within the following categories of exceptions:
it is requested by ministers pursuant to s. 18, its disclosure is necessary
for the administration or enforcement of Part II or III of the Accord Acts,
its disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings relating to the adminis-
tration or enforcement of Parts II or III, its disclosure is permissible under
the registration system, or its disclosure may be permissible under
s. 119(5).
In the final analysis, the Board has taken the position that it is free to
disclose all such classes of information that are not privileged under
s. 119(5).
The one notable circumstance in which the Boards do not disclose
information following the expiry of the stated period under s. 119(5) is
with respect to non-exclusive seismic data. In that case the privileged
period has effectively been extended by the Boards' policies of not
releasing it for a further five years. Under s. 119(5)(d), non-exclusive
seismic (i.e. seismic conducted for the purpose of public sale) is not
distinguished from but is lumped together with exclusive seismic and
characterized as "geophysical work."
The issue which has emerged from non-exclusive companies is that
non-exclusive seismic data should be treated differently and not released
by the Board without consent from the original owner. The reason offered
is that it places non-exclusive seismic companies at an unfair commercial
disadvantage because anyone can obtain, copy and sell (for profit) their
data after ten years, thereby eliminating a potential market for such
companies.
The issues are complex involving arguments respecting the AIA,
copyright and trade secrets law, and the matter continues to be an item
for further discussion.
3. The Role of the Certifying Authority
Another aspect of the Boards' mandate which has received considerable
attention of late is safety. One of the key elements in the safety regime
established by theAccordActs and administered by the Boards is the role
of the Certifying Authority (CA). While most people with an interest in
offshore oil and gas are aware that there is some requirement to obtain a
certificate of fitness, very few are familiar with how this aspect of the
regime actually works.
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Petroleum operations are governed by Part III of the Accord Acts,
which basically mirrors the federal Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act 49
that applies to federal lands. This legislation repealed and replaced the
federal Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act "I in 1992. The
impetus for this new legislation was the loss of eighty-four lives in the
sinking of the Ocean Ranger on February 15, 1982 and the subsequent
Hickman Royal Commission Report." Recommendation 91 of that
report stated, in part:
[t]hat... phase one of the safety audit or approval process, namely an
assessment of the physical integrity and stability of the rig be carried out
preferably by a classification society.
Based upon this recommendation, experience in Norway and the United
Kingdom, and a study by the Harrison Task Force,5 2 legislative amend-
ments were developed which introduced the concept of the CA into the
Canadian offshore sector.
It was decided that this should be done as part of the authorization
process. At this point it is important to realize that each of the Boards
regulates offshore activity both as an inspectorate which checks for
regulatory compliance and, if necessary, issues orders; and as a resource
manager that approves modes of development and authorizes all activi-
ties. Indeed, the Accord Acts prohibit any person from carrying on any
work or activity related to offshore petroleum unless that person is the
holder of an authorization issued by the Board 3 Authorizations are
usually issued with conditions and, of course, are subject to the Accord
Acts and regulations.54 The authorization process therefore represents
the lever by which the Board can control and influence operators,
including the safety of their works and activities. If an authorization is
withheld, suspended or revoked,5 the impact on the operator is immedi-
ate and extremely significant.
49. Supra note 21.
50. R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-7.
51. Canada/Newfoundland, Report of the Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine
Disaster, Report Two: Safety Offshore Eastern Canada, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1985) (Chairman: The Honourable T. Alex Hickman) at 155.
52. Canada, A Report by the Minister's Task Force on Ocean Ranger Regulatory Recommen-
dations - The Promotion and Enhancement of Safety in Oil & Gas Operations on Frontier
Lands (Ottawa: The Task Force, 1986).
53. NewfoundlandAccord Act, supra note 11, s. 137; Nova Scotia AccordAct supra note 15,
s. 140.
54. Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 138(4); Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 142(4).
55. Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 138(5); Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 142(5).
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The 1992 amendments to the Accord Acts added a section which
provides that an authorization cannot be issued with respect to prescribed
equipment or installations unless the Board has received from the
applicant a certificate of fitness that has been issued by an approved CA.56
The certificate must remain in force as long as the equipment is in use and
it must state that the equipment or installation is: (1) fit for the purposes
for which it is to be used and may be operated safely without posing a
threat to persons or to the environment in the location and for the time set
out in the certificate, and (2) is in conformity with all of the requirements
and conditions that are imposed, whether they are imposed by regulation
or by the Board. 7 It should be noted that a certificate is not valid if the
CA fails to comply with any procedure that is prescribed or established
by the Board or if the CA participated in the design, construction or
installation of the equipment to which the certificate applies.58
Although the CA works closely with the Board, certifying authorities
are in fact designated by the federal and provincial governments in the
respective Certificate of Fitness Regulations 59 which were promulgated
in 1995. There are currently four approved CAs, namely: (1) American
Bureau of Shipping, (2) Bureau Veritas, (3) Det Norske Veritas Classi-
fication A/S, and (4) Lloyd's Register of Shipping. Additionally, these
regulations identify four types of installations which require certificates:
diving, drilling, production and accommodation installations. For each
of these installations the regulations specify that the CA must certify that
the relevant equipment is "designed, constructed, transported and in-
stalled or established" in accordance with a defined set of regulatory
requirements. For example, a drilling installation must be in compliance
with certain provisions of the Petroleum Installation Regulations,6' Oil
and Gas Occupational Safety and Health Regulations,61 Petroleum
Drilling Regulations 62 and the Petroleum Diving Regulations .63 The CA
must also endorse on the certificate a description of the site or region in
56. Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 139.2; Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 143.2.
57. Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 139.2(3); Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 143.2(3).
58. NewfoundlandAccordAct, ibid., s. 139.2(4); Nova Scotia AccordAct, ibid., s. 143.2(4).
59. Newfoundland Certificate of Fitness Regulations, S.O.R./95-100; Nova Scotia Offshore
Certificate of Fitness Regulations, S.O.R./95-187.
60. Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Installations Regulations, S.O.R./95-104; Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Installations Regulations, S.O.R./95-191.
61. Occupational Safety and Health Regulations continue to be in draft form. However, draft
regulations are incorporated as conditions of approval for work authorizations.
62. Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Drilling Regulations, S.O.R./93-23; Nova Scotia
Offshore Petroleum Drilling Regulations, S.O.R./92-676.
63. Newfoundland Offshore Area Petroleum Diving Regulations, S.O.R./88-601; Nova
Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Diving Regulations, S.O.R./95-189.
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which the installation is to be operated and set an expiry date of up to five
years.
In addition to the above, before a certificate is issued, the CA must
submit a scope of work to the Board's Chief Safety Officer (CSO)64 The
CSO will only approve the scope of work if he or she determines that it
is sufficiently detailed to adequately assess whether the appropriate
environmental criteria are being used; that the concept safety analysis
meets the regulatory requirements; that the installation has been con-
structed in accordance with specifications and a quality assurance pro-
gram, using materials that meet design specifications; and that the
operations manual meets regulatory requirements. Typical scope-of-
work issues include demonstration of competency of CA personnel in
specialized areas, independent analysis to be undertaken, drawings to be
reviewed, tests/procedures to be witnessed, third party work to be relied
on, and deviations from regulations.
In reviewing the role of the CA, it should be stressed that the CA
process is but one component in the Board's safety regime. Obviously
this process focuses on equipment. Other Board processes address
procedures and personnel. It is also imperative to stress that the operator
and the Board are also part of the certification process; the former because
it is ultimately responsible for the safety of all its operations, as witnessed
by the legislated requirement that the operator submit a declaration
stating that (1) the equipment and installations to be used are fit for their
purpose, (2) the operating procedures are appropriate, and (3) the person-
nel are competent and qualified for their employment.65
And what about the Board - does it merely collect the declarations
and certificates of fitness and, given the statutory immunity which applies
when it issues an authorization in reliance on a declaration or certificate
of fitness, 66 issue the authorization? The answer is no. Although the
Board has a small staff and limited resources, it does maintain sufficient
expertise to carry out a monitoring and audit role with respect to the work
of the CA. The Boards continue to be very active in this "due diligence"
role. One of the lessons learned in regulating offshore activities is the
need to further document procedures and guidelines respecting the
certificate of fitness process. The Boards do not have the resources, either
in numbers or expertise, to undertake anything but a monitoring and audit
role. They must develop systems for more comprehensive and confident
64. Supra note 57, s, 6.
65. Newfoundland Accord Act, supra note 11, s. 139.1; Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note
15, s. 143.1.
66. Newfoundland Accord Act, ibid., s. 139.1(4),(7); Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s.
143.1(4),(7).
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reliance on the CA. This initiative is now underway between the C-
NSOPB and the C-NOPB, who look forward to working closely with
operators, governments and the certifying authorities in an effort to
coordinate this very important regulatory responsibility.
4. Industrial Benefits Under the Nova Scotia Accord Acts
Perhaps no other aspect of the Accord Acts attracts as much attention as
the benefits requirements. The foundation on which the current statutory
requirements related to Canada-Nova Scotia benefits was built is found
in the 1986 Nova Scotia Accord itself- the political agreement between
the federal and Nova Scotia governments. In art. 31 the governments
agreed that "first consideration" should be given to goods and services
provided from within Nova Scotia provided that - and this is an
important condition overlooked by many people - "such goods and
services are competitive in terms of fair market price, quality and
delivery." This article of the Nova Scotia Accord also states that "a
priority of the Parties shall be to encourage the hiring and training of
individuals from Nova Scotia who are qualified."
The statutory embodiment of this article of the Accord is found in s. 45
of the Nova Scotia Accord Acts which defines a Canada-Nova Scotia
benefits plan under s. 45(1):
In this section, "Canada-Nova Scotia benefits plan" means a plan for the
employment of Canadians and, in particular, members of the labour force
of the Province and, subject to paragraph (3)(d), for providing manufac-
turers, consultants, contractors and service companies in the Province and
other parts of Canada with a full and fair opportunity to participate on a
competitive basis in the supply of goods and services used in any proposed
work or activity referred to in the benefits plan.
This definition includes two crucial elements. The first is a full and fair
opportunity to participate. Canada's first offshore oil project was the
Cohasset project. The operator of the project, LASMO Nova Scotia (later
PanCanadian) filed a benefits plan in December 1989. About a month
later, almost three and a half years following the signing of the Nova
Scotia Accord, the C-NSOPB was established. One of the first issues the
C-NSOPB faced was to address how a "full and fair opportunity" could
be afforded.
It was the C-NSOPB's view at that time, and it still is, that a "full and
fair opportunity" is best evidenced by requiring the operator to adhere to
a procurement policy that is open, fair and predictable. This is normally
implemented through a process that involves notice, prequalification,
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tendering and contract award. As a result, the C-NSOPB included the
following condition in the December 1997 Sable Offshore Energy
Project Benefits Plan Decision Report. 67
Condition 10: Bidding Process
For all proposed contracts, subcontracts and purchase orders, estimated
by the Proponents to be in excess of $250,000, or such other limit as the
Board may determine, andfor any other matters identified to be of interest
to the Board, the Proponents shallprovide to the Boardfor approval, lists
of all contractors that wish to prequalify, the proposed bidders lists and
notices of the proposed final contract awards. The Proponents must
submit sufficient information with the notifications to enable the Board to
assess the subject matter and to be satisfied that the statutory requirements
for "full and fair opportunity" and "first consideration" have been
addressed by the Proponents.
Of course, there are rare cases where goods or services must be sole-
sourced. It has been our experience that this can be restricted to situations
where highly specialized goods or services are not available in Canada or
where it can be demonstrated that they are only available from a single
supplier.
Before leaving this point the element of competitiveness needs to be
stressed. This is the part of the definition that local observers sometimes
overlook. Frequently loud protest is made that local companies did not
receive their "fair share." However, unlike the C-NSOPB, these com-
mentators have no knowledge of how bids on any particular contract stack
up in terms of commercial, technical, or quality competitiveness. Indi-
cations are, however, that local companies are becoming increasingly
competitive as they gain more experience and local infrastructure grows.
The second key element of the definition is "first consideration."
Subsection 45(3) of the Nova Scotia Accord Acts requires that a benefits
plan provide for first consideration to be given to "individuals resident in
the Province" for training and employment. 68 It also states that:
first consideration shall be given to services provided from within the
Province and to goods manufactured in the Province, where those services
and goods are competitive in terms of fair market price, quality and
delivery.
Once again there is the competitiveness element, but what does "first
consideration" mean? The C-NSOPB's interpretation and application of
first consideration is applied at two separate stages during an operator's
procurement process: the establishment of the bidder's list, and the
67. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board, Sable Offshore Energy Project Benefits
Plan Decision Report (1997) at 24.
68. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 15, s. 45(3)(b).
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contract award stage. In the establishment of the bidder's lists, operators
must provide a full and fair opportunity for Nova Scotians and other
Canadians to participate in the supply of goods and services. This is
accomplished through the expression of interest/prequalification pro-
cess. In establishment of the bidder' s list if, in the opinion of the operator,
a sufficient number of qualified Nova Scotian bidders are available to
assure competitive bidding, operators then must exercise the requirement
for first consideration and limit the bid list to Nova Scotians. In the
authors' opinion, this advances one of the fundamental objectives of the
Nova Scotia Accord - that is, the recognition of the right of Nova
Scotians to be the principal beneficiaries of the offshore petroleum
resources. In such cases, the Board believes that it is quite acceptable to
limit the bidder's Lists to Nova Scotian companies. In support of this
interpretation, and to reconcile it with a full and fair opportunity for "other
Canadians," reference is made again to s. 45(1), which provides that the
requirement for a full and fair opportunity to participate is subject to
paragraph 3(d) of that section - i.e. first consideration for goods and
services from within Nova Scotia.
The second element of "first consideration" implies that when an
operator is faced with a situation where a bid submitted by a company
with low Nova Scotia content and one submitted by a company with high
Nova Scotia content are essentially equal in terms of fair market price,
quality and delivery, the latter company shall be given the award. In the
authors' opinion, this approach by the C-NSOPB has caused operators to
give local companies the nod in close bidding situations, rather than to
default to a more familiar or experienced foreign competitor. However,
it also must be acknowledged that usually bids are not equal. If pressed,
an operator can usually identify some "material" difference, be it techni-
cal, commercial or otherwise.
To conclude on this point, two issues which are sometimes raised by
those who favour a more laissez-faire approach need to be addressed.
Some argue that the employment and benefits provisions infringe upon
their rights as Canadians to live and pursue the gaining of a livelihood in
any province in that these provisions give a preference to residents of the
province. This is, of course, the mobility right guaranteed by s. 6(2)(b)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.69 In recalling the
discussions which took place prior to the adoption of the Charter, some
69. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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provinces, most notably Newfoundland, insisted that this mobility right
not restrain government's ability to address regional disparity. As a
consequence, s. 6(4) of the Charter states,
Subsections (2) and (3) do not preclude any law, program or activity that
has as its object the amelioration in a province of conditions of individuals
in that province who are socially or economically disadvantaged if the rate
of employment in that province is below the rate of employment in Canada.
The second issue relates to free trade both external and internal to Canada.
Some consider the employment and benefits provision to be contrary to
the rules of free trade. Insofar as the North American Free Trade
Agreement 70 is concerned, the existing Canada-Nova Scotia benefits
provisions are grandfathered. With respect to the Agreement on Internal
Trade,7 although the energy chapter has not been finalized, a similar
approach is being pursued.
Conclusion
Since the signing of the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland Accords and the
implementation of the Accord Acts, circumstances have arisen in the
course of industry' s quest for petroleum, not all of which would have been
contemplated when the legislation was first drafted. Consequently, from
time to time the Boards find themselves attempting to administer a regime
in the face of changing circumstances and continuing demands, thereby
giving rise to growing issues.
The issues addressed in this article are but a few. Other issues, such
as those relating to occupational safety and health, environmental assess-
ment, approval of development projects, abandonment and decommis-
sioning, regulatory consistency, or the liability of operators and contrac-
tors, could just as easily have been given equal ranking.
In dealing with these or any other issue, the interpretation and intent of
the legislation becomes the starting point for any legal analysis. The
approach to any issue first requires an understanding by the Boards,
governments, industry and other stakeholders of the intent and spirit of
the legislation. The resolution of any issue must fall within the four
comers of the legislation, regardless of how reasonable or logical the
objectives or agenda may be for the interested parties involved. Conse-
quently, the Boards, in seeking an administrative resolution of particular
issues, are governed always by the limitations or flexibility found within
the law. To the extent the legislation cannot facilitate an administrative
70. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the
Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32
I.L.M. 289 (17 December 1992) (in force 1 January 1994).
71. Agreement on Internal Trade 1995, Chapter 12, Energy (not finalized).
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solution and provide a desired result, then obviously legislative change
becomes the only option. Where the Boards, governments, industry, and
other stakeholders share a common and consistent understanding of the
governing legislation, issues nonetheless will continue to emerge as
different circumstances arise and the way of doing things changes. To the
extent that stakeholders do not share a common and consistent under-
standing of the governing legislation, issues and their resolution become





ATLANTIC ACCORD IMPLEMENTATION ACT
s. 4 Precedence over other Acts of Parliament
In case of any inconsistency or conflict between
(a) this Act or any regulations made thereunder, and
(b) any other Act of Parliament that applies to the offshore area
or any regulations made under the Act,
this Act and the regulations made thereunder take precedence.
s. 18 Access to information by governments
(1) The Federal Minister and the Provincial Minister are entitled
to access to any information or documentation relating to
petroleum resource activities in the offshore area that is
provided for the purposes of this Act or any regulation made
thereunder and such information or documentation shall, on
the request of either Minister, be disclosed to that Minister
without requiring the consent of the party who provided the
information or documentation.
Applicable provision
(2) Section 119 applies, with such modifications as the circum-
stances require, in respect of any disclosure of information
or documentation or the production or giving of evidence
relating thereto by a Minister as if the references in that
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section to the administration or enforcement of a Part of thi
Act included references to the administration or enforce.
ment of the Provincial Act or any Part thereof.
s. 119(1) In this section,
"delineation well" means a well that is so located in relatior
to another well penetrating an accumulation of petroleun
that there is a reasonable expectation that another portion ol
that accumulation will be penetrated by the first-mentionec
well and that the drilling is necessary in order to determint
the commercial value of the accumulation;
"development well" means a well that is so located ir
relation to another well penetrating an accumulation ol
petroleum that it is considered to be a well or part of a wel
drilled for the purpose of production or observation or for tht
injection or disposal of fluid into or from the accumulation
"engineering research or feasibility study" includes wor
undertaken to facilitate the design or to analyze the viabilit3
of engineering technology, systems or schemes to be used ir
the exploration for or the development, production or trans.
portation of petroleum in the offshore area;
"environmental study" means work pertaining to the mea.
surement or statistical evaluation of the physical, chemica
and biological elements of the lands, oceans or coastal zones
including winds, waves, tides, currents, precipitation, ict
cover and movement, icebergs, pollution effects, flora an(
fauna both onshore and offshore, human activity and habita
tion and any related matters;
"experimental project" means work or activity involving th
utilization of methods or equipment that are untried o
unproven;
"exploratory well" means a well drilled on a geologica
feature on which a significant discovery has not been made
"geological work" means work, in the field or laboratory
involving the collection, examination, processing or othe
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analysis of lithological, paleontological or geochemical
materials recovered from the seabed or subsoil of any portion
of the offshore area and includes the analysis and interpreta-
tion of mechanical well logs;
"geophysical work" means work involving the indirect mea-
surement of the physical properties of rocks in order to
determine the depth, thickness, structural configuration or
history of deposition thereof and includes the processing,
analysis and interpretation of material or data obtained from
such work;
"geotechnical work" means work, in the field or laboratory,
undertaken to determine the physical properties of materials
recovered from the seabed or subsoil of any portion of the
offshore area;
"well site seabed survey" means a survey pertaining to the
nature of the seabed or subsoil of any portion of the offshore
area in the area of the proposed drilling site in respect of a
well and to the conditions of those portions of the offshore
area that may affect the safety or efficiency of drilling
operations;
"well termination date" means the date on which a well or
test hole has been abandoned, completed or suspended in
accordance with any applicable regulations respecting the
drilling for petroleum made under Part III.
Privilege
(2) Subject to section 18 and this section, information or docu-
mentation provided for the purposes of this Part or Part III or
any regulation made under either Part, whether or not such
information or documentation is required to be provided
under either Part or any regulation made thereunder, is
privileged and shall not knowingly be disclosed without the
consent in writing of the person who provided it except for
the purposes of the administration or enforcement of either
Part or for the purposes of legal proceedings relating to such
administration or enforcement.
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Idem
(3) No person shall be required to produce or give evidence
relating to any information or documentation that is privi-
leged under subsection (2) in connection with any legal
proceedings, other than proceedings relating to the administra-
tion or enforcement of this Part or Part III.
Registration of documents
(4) For greater certainty, this section does not apply to a docu-
ment that has been registered under Division VIII.
Information that may be disclosed
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to the following classes of
information or documentation obtained as a result of carry-
ing on a work or activity that is authorized under Part III,
namely, information or documentation in respect of
(a) an exploratory well, where the information or documenta-
tion is obtained as a direct result of drilling the well and if two
years have passed since the well termination date of that
well;
(b) a delineation well, where the information or documentation
is obtained as a direct result of drilling the well and if the later
of
(i) two years since the well termination date of the relevant
exploratory well, and
(ii) ninety days since the well termination date of the delin-
eation well,
have passed;
(c) a development well, where the information or documenta-
tion is obtained as a direct result of drilling the well and if the
later of
(i) two years since the well termination date of the
relevant exploratory well and
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(ii) sixty days since the well termination date of the
development well,
have passed;
(d) geological work or geophysical work performed on or in
relation to any portion of the offshore area,
(i) in the case of a well site seabed survey where the well
has been drilled, after the expiration of the period referred
to in paragraph (a) or the later period referred to in
subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii) or (c)(i) or (ii), according to
whether paragraph (a), (b) or (c) is applicable in respect of
that well, or
(ii) in any other case, after the expiration of five years
following the date of completion of the work;
(e) any engineering research or feasibility study or experimental
project, including geotechnical work, carried out on or in
relation to any portion of the offshore area,
(i) where it relates to a well and the well has been drilled,
after the expiration of the period referred to in paragraph
(a) or the later period referred to in subparagraph (b)(i)
or (ii) or (c)(i) or (ii), according to whether paragraph (a),
(b) or (c) is applicable in respect of that well, or
(ii) in any other case, after the expiration of five years
following the date of completion of the research, study
or project or after the reversion of that portion of the
offshore area to Crown reserve areas, whichever occurs
first;
(f) any contingency plan formulated in respect of emergencies
arising as a result of any work or activity authorized under
Part III;
(g) diving work, weather observation or the status of operational
activities or of the development of or production from a pool
or field;
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(g.1) accidents, incidents or petroleum spills, to the extent
necessary to permit a person or body to produce and to
distribute or publish a report for the administration of this
Act in respect of the accident, incident or spill;
(h) any study funded from an account established under subsec-
tion 76(1) of the Canada Petroleum Resources Act, if the
study has been completed; and
(i) an environmental study, other than a study referred to in
paragraph (h),
(i) where it relates to a well and the well has been drilled,
after the expiration of the period referred to in paragraph
(a) or the later period referred to in subparagraph (b)(i)
or (ii) or (c)(i) or (ii), according to whether paragraph (a),
(b) or (c) is applicable in respect of that well, or
(ii) in any other case, if five years have passed since the
completion of the study.
(6) Repealed 1988 c. 28 s. 260
